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COMMONALITY OF STANDARDS - IMPLICATIONS FOR
SOVEREIGNTY - A U.S. PERSPECTIVE
Shirley Coffield
The relationship between the United States and Canada covers everything
from meat to nuts. What I am going to talk about are the nuts. Attacks on the
NAFTA, the WTO, or trade agreements in general is nuts, especially if you
are saying that it is a sovereignty issue. We are probably all sick to death bf
people's definitions of sovereignty. But excessive reference, I believe, to
intrusions on sovereignty in connection with trade agreements brings out the
extremes: the extreme interventionists who want other countries to do exactly
what we do, the isolationists who do not want us to conform to anybody
else's rules, and all of the special interest groups, "nuts" in the American
vernacular, which tend then to lobby against these agreements based upon
misinformation and emotion rather than serious, meaty issues as to whether
or not our sovereignty is in fact implicated by these agreements.
Having said that, the issue of standards and their impact on international
trade is an impossibly broad topic. Much of what now traverses the world in
the form of goods, services, and investments is affected by standards. Many
of the topics being covered in this conference involve standards: federal/state
NAFTA issues, culture and the information revolution, environmental issues,
investment issues, food safety regulations, and, as you will hear in just a few
minutes, professional services.
I want to confine myself to the issues of product trade and technical bar-
riers found in the Standards Related Measures (SRM) provisions of Chapter
9 of the NAFTA. However, I do feel that I have to say something about sov-
ereignty. Serious issues of sovereignty can be much overused when discuss-
ing international trade agreements signed by sovereign countries pursuant to
their internal procedures of approval and ratification as ceded to them by the
electorate in a representative government. By definition, a trade agreement is
not a dictation by another country on the sovereignty of another. It is a use of
sovereignty by countries to reach agreement on subjects that are of concern
to all involved. If the definition we have all learned is that sovereignty is the
independent right of a country to regulate its internal affairs without foreign
* Shirley Coffield is a partner in the law firm of Keller & Heckman, L.L.P. in
Washington, D.C. She received her B.A. in political science from Willamette University, a
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dictation, then I submit that much, if not all, of what is included in the
NAFTA, is not the result of foreign dictation, but of recent agreement among
sovereign countries. Therefore, what I am talking about, I would term in my
own definition, is shared sovereignty, rather than the usual definition of sov-
ereignty which has been discussed by others.
The question of sovereignty can arise, of course, in an agreement, pri-
marily in the field of dispute resolution. There are those who say that exter-
nal judges of a sovereign's compliance with international rule might, in fact,
involve an issue of sovereignty. However, I would submit that what happens
in international trade agreements is not in dispute. Settlement, in fact, is not
foreign dictation, nor is it coercion, as has always been the case. There is no
invading army that enforces any ruling of a panel or of any international or-
ganization in trade agreements. There are consequences to disobeying the
rules, and sovereigns have got to be willing to follow the rules. However, I
cannot think of any major country that has always followed every ruling
against an international trade agreement. There are mutually agreed-upon
rules. There are consequences if you do not follow them, but nobody "nukes"
you, and it is hardly a question of an intrusion on your sovereignty. However,
recognizing that this issue of sovereignty is of great sensitivity, I hope to
demonstrate that the product standards provisions in the NAFTA consist of,
at most, shared sovereignty, which does not intrude on the right of countries
to use the standards, but rather enhances their ability to develop new stan-
dards in a way that encourages compatibility and increases trade. Thus, they
not only protect their own citizens internally, which is a major role of a sov-
ereign, but they also give their citizens an equal opportunity to compete in
other sovereign countries.
The tension in the standards area is between that right of a country to
regulate in the area of safety and the health of its animals, plants, and humans
against their commitment to minimize barriers to trade. That great tension is
what leads to agreements to find a mutual accommodation of those two
goals. In the NAFTA SRM agreement, the explicit issue of sovereignty is
addressed at the beginning in Article 904, which establishes the right of each
Party to adopt, maintain, or apply any SRM related to the protection of hu-
man, animal, or plant life or health, the environment, or consumers, and any
measure to ensure its enforcement and implementation, including the right to
prohibit imports.' I would maintain that, on the face of it, that dispenses with
the issue of sovereignty as we know it in the case of a trade agreement. That
Article also provides that each Party may, in pursuing its legitimate objec-
tives of safety in the protection of human, animal, or plant life, establish the
I NAFTA, North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 8, 1992, Canada/Mexico/United
States, 32 I.L.M. 289, at art. 904(1).
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levels of the protection that it considers appropriate, so long as it is nondis-
criminatory, provides national treatment, and is on an MFN basis.
One concern which arose involving internal federal/state/provincial sepa-
ration of powers, which is a very sensitive issue as we all know, was also
addressed in Article 901. Article 901 makes it clear that the federal govern-
ment can always mandate compliance by sub-federal governments and non-
governmental organizations (NGOs). 2 Thus, the Parties themselves, all sub-
ject to the overall obligations to comply, would only seek through appropri-
ate measures to ensure observance of Articles of this agreement by states,
provinces, or NGOs. Each one of those words was painfully negotiated. They
seek, through appropriate measures, to ensure observance. In order to exactly
protect the sensitivities of that particular concern, I cite these provisions af-
fecting internal jurisdiction, not as questions of sovereignty, but to demon-
strate that, in the context of the SRM agreement, the Parties had to be sensi-
tive to even more delicate issues than was the case in most other aspects of
the NAFrA. As regards SRMs, however, the concern over sovereignty has
arisen essentially, as in the case of most trade agreements, and how people
interpret the details, concerning the interpretation of this agreement is played
in the media as having potential intrusions on sovereignty.
Do any of these provisions really affect sovereignty? Product standards,
certifications, labeling requirements, and similar requirements by individual
countries are increasingly becoming a main source of trade disputes and are a
potential and a real obstacle to trade. As tariffs continue downward world-
wide, and as trade thus increases, products are faced with a growing array of
regulatory requirements when entering export markets. We may ask, why did
this not happen twenty years ago? It is not as though the standards were not
there twenty years ago. It is because a lot of trade did not move due to tariff
barriers; the standards were really never implemented. You could not get into
the market because the tariff was twenty or thirty percent. Now you find that
there are other things in that market that may affect your trade even more
than a barrier, because they are not price-related. They are related to a physi-
cal obstacle in terms of the standards with which the product must comply.
As a private practitioner, I found that my own practice has shifted in the last
seven or eight years. It now consists of dealing with regulatory issues for the
most part, primarily those involving food or product standards. Obviously, it
is in the private sector where we know that issues are real issues. If that has
happened in my practice, I assume it has happened in a lot of other people's
practices as well.
2 Id., art. 902(2).
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Product standards are necessary. They need not be trade barriers. They
can be fully justified in many instances. However, with growing globaliza-
tion and the increasing number of markets, confusion in setting standards,
and in enforcing them has increased. In the international trade establishment,
the goal has been to prevent standards from operating as unnecessary obsta-
cles to trade. The standards-related measures in Chapter 9 cover three differ-
ent kinds of measures, including what the parties term as standards, technical
regulations, and conformity assessment procedures. Standards, under Chapter
9, are defined as providing:
[F]or common and repeated use, rules, guidelines, or characteristics
for products, or related processes and production methods, or for
services or related operating methods with which compliance is not
mandatory... [including] terminology, symbols, packaging, mark-
ing or labeling requirements as they apply to a product, process, or
production or operating method. ' 3
This is the important part of the term "standards." Under the NAFTA, stan-
dards by definition are not mandatory, and are most frequently set by private
standardizing bodies.4
An example would be the standards developed by the American Society
of Testing, which has issued over eight thousand five hundred voluntary
standards. Governments can also set voluntary standards. An example in the
United States would be the Consumer Products Safety Commission (CPSC).
There is, in the United States, a proliferation of private standard-setting or-
gainzations. According to a study by the Organization for Economic Coop-
eration and Development (OECD), in 1991, the number of standards set in
the United States by private organizations numbered thirty-five thousand.
The U.S. government frequently relies on these private voluntary standards.
It is especially important, therefore, that both the GATT agreement and the
NAFTA cover this particular area. This is one part of the NAFTA that covers
a private action, not a government action. To the extent that a country can
ensure that its voluntary standards do not operate as trade barriers, it would
have to have a great deal of control over these non-governmental standard-
setting bodies.
Once again, as noted earlier, the obligation in the NAFTA is that the gov-
ernmental Parties to the agreement seek to ensure that these private standard-
setting bodies conform to the obligations in the agreement. This is a lesser
obligation than in other parts of the NAFTA, simply because it is dealing
3 Id., art. 915(l).
4Id., art. 915(l).
[Vol. 24.235 1998
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with a private entity, rather than something over which the government has
direct control through its regulatory process. However, it is important to note
that the consequence of violating the agreement is the same for a private
body as it is for a government. If a government undertakes the obligation, if
there is a private standard-setting organization that has, in fact, impeded trade
through the way it set its standard or because the standard is unreasonable,
the government pays for that.
That is not unusual in the case of a federal, provincial, or a federal/state
relationship both in the WTO and NAFTA, as well. The agreement does not
require the federal government to do what they cannot do, which is mandate
certain things. It does require the government to be.responsible in terms of
their "payment" if their entities have not complied. Technical regulations
under the NAFTA cover the mandatory government product standards. These
include the same definitions of standards as the voluntary ones, except that
these are mandatory. They may first have been developed by a private stan-
dard-setting body and then have been adopted and been made mandatory by
the government, which is frequently the case.
The U.S. government, for example, increasingly relies on the private
sector to develop standards which are adopted. One example that I can give
you is in the area of government procurement. This can be positive, in that it
relieves the government from a long process of having to set the standard. It
lets the industry that is most knowledgeable about the product or the process
set the standards. It also, however, can be a problem. I just give one example
in the case of government procurement, when the company bidding on the
contract sets the standard. There is something to be said here about fairness.
And in that particular case, I looked very closely at the standard, and it was
very hard for anybody else to meet that standard except for the company that
had been bidding on it. The U.S. Department of Defense thought that it was a
good standard, so they adopted it. That contract went out for bid, and,
frankly, nobody else could meet that standard. So there does need to be some
checks and balances on this issue of voluntary standards, particularly when
they are set by a particular company, rather than being set industry-wide.
Comformity of assessment procedure is any procedure used directly or
indirectly to determine that a technical regulation or standard is fulfilled,
including sampling, testing, inspection, evaluation, verification, monitoring,
auditing, assurance of conformity, accreditation of registration, or approval,
et cetera. But on the strong lobbying of the Food & Drug Administration
during the course of these negotiations, the United States has interpreted this
to mean that issues that are country-sensitive, such as registration or approval
of a pharmaceutical, would not be a conformity assessment procedure. One
of the success stories in the NAFTA is the mutual recognition of the Under-
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writers' Laboratories and the Canadian Testing Standards. These bodies have
now become competitors in North America because a manufacturer can go to
either one of them and get a stamp of approval which is good in either coun-
try. It is what is most convenient, what is most cost-effective. It is what I
would call one of the confirmations that these kinds of agreements can posi-
tively increase trade, not just be an obstacle.
In determining how best to police or enforce agreements, it is necessary
to look at voluntary and mandatory standards and conformity assessment
procedures together. This is not always easy to do, as internal compliance as
to how these are treated may vary. However, to the extent that each can be
used as an obstacle to trade, they must be addressed similarly as involves the
commitments of the governments to minimize trade barriers.
The basic obligation in the NAFTA is that SRMs are to be nondiscrimi-
natory, and that no Party may prepare, adopt, or apply any SRM with a view
to, or with the effect of, creating an unnecessary obstacle to trade. This obli-
gation basically reflects the GATT-WTO technical barriers to trade agree-
ment principles. The critical detail in the obligation is that Parties may have
SRMs that restrict trade, so long as a demonstrable purpose of the measure is
to achieve a legitimate objective, and the measure does not operate to ex-
clude goods that meet the objective. The legitimate object activities are fur-
ther described, not exclusively, as those involving safety, protection of hu-
man, animal, or plant life or health, and the environment, including matters
involving quality and identifiabilty of goods and services and parenthetical
sustainable development, considering a number of factors in sustainable de-
velopment, such as climate, but not including the protection of domestic pro-
duction. So, once again, you have a series of attempts to define what is le-
gitimate. But still, you put in the caveat that, if somebody can prove that this
is a protection of domestic production, it is not, in fact, within that discretion.
These obligations contain a fairly broad opt-out provision for those con-
cerned about the sovereignty of the Parties to develop social goal standards,
especially when, ultimately, the Parties initially determine which SRMs that
Party considers appropriate. If the Parties do set SRMs which would other-
wise be inconsistent, for example, mandating a stricter standard than that
promulgated by an international body, then under the provisions of the code,
they can do a risk assessment to justify the legitimacy of the standard. Risk
assessments are otherwise voluntary. However, if a Party does use a risk as-
sessment in determining the legitimacy of its objectives, the agreement re-
quires that certain conditions be met; most importantly, that the higher stan-
dard is not a disguised restriction on trade and does not discriminate or result
in an arbitrary or unjustifiable distinction between similar goods with similar
risk levels in the degree of the restriction.
[Vol. 24:235 1998
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An important part of this agreement, which is also the case in the GATT-
WTO agreement, is a commitment to use, to the extent possible, international
standards, both those in existence and those whose completion is imminent. I
will get to this problem of international harmonization. I will note here that
the progress for agreement and approval of international standards through
the Codex,5 International Standards Organization, and similar organizations
frequently takes several years, and the standard may be obsolete by the time
it is published. Therefore, that can be something of a limiting objective.
Likewise, SRMs that comply with an international standard are deemed to be
consistent with the agreement.
However, once again, there is an out. Parties may, if pursuing their le-
gitimate objectives, adopt, maintain, or apply a standard with a higher level
of protection than that of the international standard. Once again, this provi-
sion was intended to answer critics who said that the agreement would result
in downward harmonization; something that, by the way, has not happened. I
think that, by highlighting certain issues such as sovereignty, you attract dis-
putes rather than help solve them.
The NAFTA does go beyond the GATT Technical Barriers to Trade
6(TBT) agreement, in that it commits the Parties, to the extent practicable, to
make their respective SRMs compatible, so as to facilitate trade between the
Parties. The idea of the compatibility of the standard can be addressed in a
regional agreement far more readily than it can in a multilateral agreement.
In addition, each Party must treat technical regulations adopted or maintained
by the other Party as equivalent to its own, when the exporting Party in coop-
eration with the importing Party demonstrates to the satisfaction of the im-
porting Party that its technical regulations adequately fulfill the important
Party's legitimate objectives.
This was written by lawyers, and what it means is that, if you can con-
vince the other guy that what you have done is to make your products basi-
cally equivalent, they are going to let it in. Sometimes, your tongue kind of
trips over this language. What it really represents is a very practical approach
to setting and enforcing standards in the NAFTA countries.
Under the agreement, the Parties also agree to accept the results of a con-
formity assessment procedure of another Party whenever possible. That is,
once again, if you can convince the other guy that this has been done in a
5 Codex Alimentarius is the food safety organization for GATT and NAFTA. Countries
must base their SPS measures on Codex standards unless a scientific basis exists for a higher
level of protection. The WTO is using Codex as their reference organization for food safety in
implementing GATT. See <http://www.tasinc.com/tas-code.html> (visited on July 7, 1998).
6 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade,
Dec. 15, 1993.
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way that, in fact, meets your legitimate objectives. Unfortunately, despite the
passage of several years, there are still a lot of potential disputes, ambiguity,
and language of compatibility in North America. All sides seem to be deter-
mined not to change one iota of their own regulations and to assume that any
change they would have to make would be a step downward.
One example dealing with food is nutrition labeling. I use this example
because it is something in which, to my great frustration, I get involved in
quite a bit between the United States and Canada. The United States has
made its own determination as to what it considers necessary on a food label,
and that is mandatory. If you pick up a head of lettuce which is in shrink
wrap, it has something on the back. Canada, on the other hand, has deter-
mined that, if you label, you have to include things which are different than
the things included on the U.S. label, and it has to be in both English and
French. Therefore, you have a natural trade barrier determined by market size
for selling these products in both markets. You defeat economies of scale,
which the agreement was supposed to encourage. I have always felt that we
can put the information in English and French, and we could have one nutri-
tion label. Surely we ought to be able to come up with something on which
both Parties can agree. This has been going on for years, and I am told that,
until a certain person in the Canadian government retires, it is unlikely that it
will be resolved.
This brings me back to our main issue. If one is calling that a sovereignty
issue, one has a very, very broad definition of sovereignty. That is what you
find both in our Food & Drug Administration and in Canadian Health. There
are pockets of extreme views which state that we do not change whatsoever.
Our idea of harmonization is forcing someone else to change to meet our
standard. Frankly, that is not going to work, even in the context of our similar
systems. And no way is it going to work in a multilateral globalized system.
Which, of all these provisions in the SRM agreement, have a nexus to sover-
eignty as we defined it earlier? In which of these provisions have the Parties
been dictated to by an outside power about their own internal standards and
regulations? The agreement does not require any Party to even adopt a stan-
dard of any kind. It commits Parties by agreement to be non-discriminatory if
they do adopt a standard, and provides for the mutual recognition of certain
procedures and standards, but only if they meet the need of the legitimate
objectives of the importing country.
I do not see serious sovereignty issues here. The operation of the agree-
ment thus far does not appear to have confirmed any of the worst fears of
those who see intrusions on sovereignty in every paragraph of every trade
agreement. The enforcement and monitoring of the obligations in the area of
standards has been going on internationally in the GATT since the Tokyo
[Vol. 24.235 1998
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Round. The enforcement mechanisms in the NAFTA do not threaten the ob-
jectives of national regulations, but only the means by which they are arrived
at and implemented. It is a very minimal effect on the sovereignty of the Par-
ties. It can instead be viewed as an enhancement of sovereignty. The Parties
can agree among themselves to have some input on how standards are
viewed by other Parties.
Looking at the present and the past, we see how far we have come. It
seems to me we should now look at how countries can avoid standards-
related barriers and enforce agreements while recognizing and accepting the
necessary legitimate positive roles that product standards have in achieving
each individual country's policy objectives. Countries may have different
policy objectives. There is nothing wrong with having a standard that meets
an objective. In this respect, I recommend to you a publication from the
Brookings Institute by Alan Sykes, titled Product Standards for Internation-
ally Integrated Goods Markets.7 It is an excellent analysis of the issues, and
along with the views expressed by commentators and the comments also
included in that study, it expresses a really good, broad discussion of all of
the issues.
In the context of future agreements, bilateral, regional, or multilateral, we
have several models from which we can borrow to achieve our stated objec-
tive. The E.U. system is frequently cited as a potential model for future inter-
nationalization. However, that presupposes a union, which is not realistic as
an international approach. Some of its more useful and important features
can be adapted, including its heavy reliance on mutual acceptance of stan-
dards. It has been suggested that the concept of least-restrictive-means,
which is in the GATT and TBT has a usefulness over time. The least-
restrictive-means obligation commits parties to ensure that TBTs be no more
trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfill the legitimate objective. I consider
this standard to be like flypaper for disputes. Is it legitimate? Is it reasonable?
All of these questions just make lawyers glow, because it leaves the Parties
with so much arguing and wiggle room that it encourages clever ways to
avoid getting caught by the flypaper in a trade restrictive action, and can lead
to politically correct, but inconsistent rulings.
The standards can only be optimally beneficial if they are coupled with a
strong emphasis on plurilateral negotiations on a sectoral basis, which can
result in some elements of harmonization, some elements of mutual accep-
tance of conformity assessment regimes, and some of mutual recognition of
standards. There must be elements in any kind of agreement that allow coun-
tries to reasonably set standards that will not intrude on sovereignty. At the
7 ALAN SYKES, PRODUCT STANDARDS FOR INTERNATIONALLY INTEGRATED GOODS
MARKETS (Brookings Inst. 1995).
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same time, you are minimizing barriers to trade, and I believe there are mod-
els out there that prove that this can be accomplished.
10
Canada-United States Law Journal, Vol. 24 [1998], Iss. , Art. 33
https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/cuslj/vol24/iss/33
